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Abstract:  This paper uses unique bank-by-bank balance sheet and income statement 
information to investigate the intermediation efficiency in the Nigerian pre-consolidated 
banking sector during 2000-2005. The author analyzes whether the Central Bank of 
Nigeria’s policy of recent banking consolidation can be justified and rationalized by 
looking at the determinants of spreads. Indeed, a spread decomposition and panel 
estimations show that the reform of the banking sector could be the first step to raise the 
intermediation efficiency of the Nigerian banking sector. The author finds that larger 
banks have enjoyed lower overhead costs, increased concentration in the banking sector 
has not been detrimental to the spreads, both increased holdings of liquidity and capital 
might have led to lower spreads in 2005, and a stable macroeconomic environment is 
conducive to a more efficient channeling of savings to productive investments. 
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The Nigerian banking sector has experienced a boom-and-bust cycle in the past 20 years. 
After Nigeria implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) deregulated the financial sector, new banks proliferated, 
mainly driven by attractive arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange market. But 
relative to the pre-deregulated period, financial intermediation never took off and even 
declined in the 1980s and 1990s. With the bursting of the bubble during the early 1990s 
in a very volatile macroeconomic environment, Nigeria’s banking sector was still 
characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and low levels of financial 
intermediation up to 2004. 
This paper is motivated by the CBN’s recent reforms to consolidate the banking 
sector by drastically increasing the minimum capital requirements from 2 billion Nigerian 
Naira (NN) to NN25 billion ($ US 190 million). This led to a remarkable reduction of the 
number of banks from 89 to 25, mainly by mergers and acquisitions, by the beginning of 
2006 in a very short period of time.  
We use unique bank-by-bank balance sheet and income statement information 
from the CBN to investigate the intermediation efficiency in the pre-consolidated 
banking sector during 2000-2005. We aim to analyze whether the CBN’s policy of 
banking consolidation can be justified and rationalized by looking at the determinants of 
spreads. 
Interest rate spreads are often used as proxies for the efficiency of financial 
intermediation. If there were no market frictions and transaction costs, lending and 
deposit rates would be equal. But since screening and monitoring borrowers is costly, 
there is a wedge between the lending and deposit rates.  
  Our findings provide some evidence that indeed it was the right decision of the 
CBN to radically change the market structure of the banking sector. A spread 
decomposition shows that spreads have been coming down in the past years, together 
with an overall decline in lending and deposit rates. Larger banks have especially enjoyed 
lower overhead costs that have materialized in higher profit margins and also charge 
lower spreads than smaller banks.   3
  The panel estimations indicate that spreads are negatively related to equity and 
liquidity in 2005 as well as to banking concentration. Unlike findings from previous 
studies (e.g Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) that increased holdings of liquidity are 
foregone interest income which banks attempt to recover from borrowers in the form of 
higher spreads and that excessive capital holdings can be costly for banks, leading to 
higher spreads, Nigerian banks are flush with liquidity and equity so increased 
competition for lending outlets might have reduced the spreads in 2005.  
Also, there has been no evidence that increased banking concentration has been 
detrimental to the spreads in the pre-consolidated banking sector. Furthermore, higher 
overhead costs lead to an increase of spreads. Overall, spreads are driven by bank-
specific, banking industry-level factors as well as macroeconomic variables. We find 
strong evidence that inflation, the real Treasury bill rate and partly a weaker exchange 
rate are positively related to the spreads. Therefore, a stable macroeconomic environment 
is potentially conducive to a higher level of financial intermediation. 
With the consolidation, banks’ profit margins are likely to be slowly eroded, and 
increased bank holdings of liquidity as well as equity will put further pressure on the 
spreads, thus potentially raising the intermediating potential of the 25 banks that 
remained from the original 89 banks. It is also likely that economies of scales among the 
merged banking entities will be materialized, potentially causing a sizable reduction in 
overhead costs that could eventually also increase the intermediating efficiency. 
  We complement the main panel estimations with extensive robustness and 
sensitivity tests in order to check the validity of the main results. The paper is organized 
as follows:  Section II provides a short literature overview, and section III describes some 
developments in the Nigerian banking industry. Next, the data and methodology is 
explained in section IV followed by the results and robustness tests in sections V and VI, 
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II. Literature Overview 
There are not many econometric studies that investigate the spreads and margins in 
African countries. This is often due to a lack of adequate panel data for commercial 
banks. Among some of the studies are Birungi (2005) and Beck and Hesse (2006) on 
Uganda. The latter analyze Ugandan bank spreads and margins from 1999-2005 and find 
that spreads and margins have been mainly driven by time invariant bank characteristics 
as well as overhead costs and sectoral compositions of loans. Another example is Chirwa 
and Mlachila (2004) who investigate bank margins in Malawi after the financial 
liberalization. The authors consider different definitions for the margins and find that the 
determinants of the margins in Malawi often depend on the particular margin definition 
used. Finally, Enendu (2003) analyzes ex-ante commercial bank interest rates spreads in 
Nigeria. He finds that macroeconomic and monetary policy/ financial regulation factors 
were more important than bank-specific factors. Given the small sample of banks (13 in 
total) the results are not representative for the whole Nigerian banking sector. 
The related literature on the determinants of margins and spreads is abundant, and 
in the following we only mention some of the key papers. The seminal paper is by Ho 
and Saunders (1981) who develop a dealership model of bank spreads where banks are 
risk-averse and balance the deposit and loan markets. Since loans and deposits have 
different maturity profiles, banks charge a fee (spread) for the provision of liquidity under 
uncertainty. 
On the empirical front, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) in a cross-country 
study find evidence for a strong positive relationship between nonfinancial costs such as 
overhead costs and margins. According to the evidence of Hannan and Liang (1993) as 
well as Barajas et al (1999, 2000) margins are positively related to market power. But 
there is also some evidence that market structure indicators such as Herfindahl indices or 
concentration ratios are not good indicators of the competitiveness and contestability of 
banking systems. For instance, Claessens and Laeven (2004) show there is a lack of 
correlation between concentration ratios and competitiveness in banking sectors. Market 
structure indicators do not take into account segmentation in the banking system or threat 
of entry from new institutions.
1  
                                                 
1 Also, Herfindahl indices do not convey any information about efficiency per se.   5
Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000) show that 
reserve requirements are positively related to spreads in some Latin American and 
developing countries since reserve requirements can be seen as an implicit tax on banks. 
The results on the link between margins and provision for bad debts have been more 
mixed. On the one hand, there has been some evidence by Brock and Rojas-Suarez 
(2000) for a negative relationship in Argentina and Peru that the authors explain with 
deficient banking supervision and past poor provisioning for loan losses. On the other 
hand, Barajas et al (1999) suggest that banks could charge higher spreads by shifting 
costs for screening and monitoring to borrowers. Furthermore, Martinez Peria and Mody 
(2004) find for their Latin American panel that the entry of foreign banks has led to lower 
margins. 
Cross-country comparisons have shown that the contractual and informational 
environments affect not only the level but also efficiency of financial intermediation. For 
instance, Demirguc-Kunt et al (2004) and Laeven and Majnoni (2005) find that countries 
with less efficient legal systems and more limited credit information sharing have higher 
spreads and margins. Furthermore, inflation is often found to be positively related to 
margins and spreads especially in developing countries with high and volatile inflation 
rates. (For instance, see Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Claessens et al (2001) 
This paper is also related to a small literature on the financial sector in Nigeria. 
Lewis and Stein (1997, 2002) provide a political economy explanation for the financial 
liberalization in the late 1980s and the subsequent burst of the bubble. Beck et al (2005) 
analyze the effects of banking privatization (initiated in 1992) on banking performance 
during 1990-2001 and find that out of 14 privatized banks, the performance of 9 banks 
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III. Developments in the Nigerian Banking Sector 
In this section, we will give a brief overview of the main developments and trends in the 
Nigerian banking sector.
 2 Nigeria had its first banking legislation in 1952, and the CBN 
started operations including banking regulation in 1959. In the 1970s the Nigerian 
banking sector was faced with the government’s introduction of various control measures 
such as the nationalization of many foreign-owned banks, an entry restriction, a deposit 
rate floor or an interest rate ceiling (Beck at al, 2005). 
In 1986 Nigeria implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in which 
World Bank and IMF prescriptions comprised a currency devaluation, trade liberalization 
and privatization of state enterprises among others. In this context, some of the direct 
control measures from the 1970s were loosened such as entry restrictions or interest rate 
controls. Before the financial deregulation began in 1986, the banking sector has been 
described as static for almost 10 years with 29 commercial banks owning 60% of total 
banking assets and the rest represented by 12 merchant institutions (see also Lewis and 
Stein, 1997). 
The financial liberalization saw the entry of many new banking institutions. For 
instance, the number of banks increased from 40 banks in 1985 to over 100 banks in 1990 
(table 1). One of the reasons was the parallel exchange rate regime due to the perceived 
overvaluation of the domestic currency which allowed banks to quickly make profits 
from various arbitrage opportunities. Hereby, banks with connections to the political elite 
often had preferred access to exchange rate auctions and could sell the foreign exchange 
for a high premium especially in relation to increased trade-related financing after the 
SAP and the implemented trade liberalization. 
Although the contribution of the financial sector to GDP increased after the 
financial deregulation and even surpassed the manufacturing share in GDP by 1990 
(Lewis and Stein, 1997), the Nigerian financial sector actually saw a financial 
disintermediation. Many of the new banks were not interested in intermediating funds 
from depositors to lenders but rather made quick profits from the arbitrage and other rent-
seeking activities (often not legal). According to table 1, bank assets, private credit or 
financial system deposits as share of GDP were lower in 1990 than in 1985.  
                                                 
2 Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) provide a comprehensive overview of financial sector reform in Nigeria.   7
As a consequence of the high fragmentation and low financial intermediation, the 
Nigerian authorities established some prudential guidelines in 1990-91 and a moratorium 
on new bank licenses in 1991. The financial bubble burst as stock market prices fell 
sharply, and the extent of non-performing loans became evident. For example, during 
1992-93, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (established 1988) announced that 
24 banks were insolvent and 26 in serious trouble; these 50 banks had two-thirds of total 
banking assets and three-quarters of deposits in Nigeria’s financial system (Lewis and 
Stein, 1997). Also, according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Nigeria faced a systemic 
banking crisis throughout the 1990s. Nigeria’s financial indicators such as liquid 
liabilities, bank assets, private credit or financial system deposits therefore remained 
relatively low throughout the 1990s by historical standards and the 1985 figures and only 
started to significantly increase after 2000 (table 1).    
In 1998, 26 bank licenses were revoked, reducing the total number of banks from 
115 to 89. Even though the macroeconomic environment improved with a new civilian 
government regime after 1999, the Nigerian financial system was still characterized by 
very high fragmentation and low financial intermediation. 
In this context, the CBN decreed on July, 6, 2004 that banks had to increase their 
minimum capital requirements from NN2 billion to NN25 billion ($ US 190 million) by 
the end of 2005. The intention was to increase the average size of banks via merger and 
acquisitions to materialize economies of scales, create new product development and 
overall generate a more stable banking system with a higher contribution to financial 
intermediation. By the beginning of 2006, the number of banks shrank from 89 to 25 
banks with 14 banks from the original 89 banks failing to increase their capital or secure 
merger partners. For many foreign-owned banks, the new capital requirements were 
achieved by capital injections from the parent company. Also, in the process of the 
banking consolidation, banks raised over $ US 3 billion on the Nigerian stock market. 
Banks became flush with excess liquidity and equity.  
Going forward, it is expected that the previous very high profit margins from 
often non-lending activities will be eroded, and many banks are likely to enter the retail 
lending market or expand their geographical scope into other regions in West Africa.  
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IV. Data and Methodology 
We have quarterly balance sheet and income statement data from the CBN on all 89 
Nigerian banks from 2000-2005 that allows us to investigate which bank-specific, 
industry and macroeconomic characteristics were the main drivers for the spreads in 
Nigeria. We look at the efficiency of financial intermediation especially the effects of 
overhead costs, bank-specific liquidity and capital holdings as well as the competitive 
structure of the banking industry on spreads. 
 
Accounting Decomposition 
As a first exercise following Beck and Fuchs (2004), we conduct an accounting 
decomposition of the interest rate spread. Similar to Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), we 
define the spread as the difference between interest income received on loans (divided by 
total loans) and the interest expenses paid on deposits (divided by total deposits).  
Unlike Beck and Fuchs (2004), we do not have information on ex-ante contracted 
interest rates so both the implicitly calculated lending and deposit rates are ex-post since 
they are based on the ex-post balance sheet and income statement information of the 
Nigerian banks. Therefore, we assume that the ex-post spread already accounts for 
portfolio quality, that is, loan loss provisions do not appear as a factor in the accounting 
decomposition.
3  
However, spreads depend on the tax rate, reserve requirements, overhead costs 
and the profit margin. The tax rate is calculated from the actual tax payments of the 
banks, that is, one minus the after-tax over the pre-tax income, and the reserve 
requirement is 10%. We use the overhead costs attributable to loans and identify those by 
calculating the share of loan interest revenue to total revenue. In other words, the relevant 
overhead costs are equal to the share of loan income multiplied by total overhead costs 
over total loans. The profit margin is a residual after accounting for all the components 
and can be expressed as follows (Beck and Fuchs, 2004): 
Profit Margin= (1-tax rate) x (implicit lending rate- implicit deposit rate/ 
(1- reserve requirement)- overhead costs attributable to loans),     
                                                 
3 In the panel estimations, we will rectify this by including loan loss provisions as an explanatory factor for 
the interest rate spreads.   9
where the implicit lending rate corresponds to the first component of the above-defined 
spread, and the implicit deposit rate to the second component. Beck and Fuchs (2004) 
rearrange the above formula to obtain the implicit spread as a function of the reserve 
requirement, overhead costs, profit margin and tax rate. Finally, the figures in the spread 




Secondly, following Ho and Saunders (1981), Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and other 
authors, we estimate a general class of regressions for the spreads of the form  
t i t t t i t i M I B Spread , , , ε δ γ β α + + + + =                                                      
where i indexes bank i and t indexes time t;  t i B ,  is a vector of bank-specific variables for 
bank i and time t;  t I  contains time varying, banking industry- specific variables;  t M is a 
vector of time-variant macroeconomic variables, and  t i, ε is the residual. Finally, we 
control for year and seasonal effects by including yearly dummy variables and dummy 
variables for each quarter in all model specifications except the models that contain 
macroeconomic variables. 
We will estimate the spread equations with both pooled OLS and mainly fixed 
effects regressions, where we control for time-invariant bank-specific effects.
5 For both 
the OLS and fixed effects regressions, we will allow for clustered standard errors across 
observations of the same bank, that is, we will relax the condition that error terms of 
observations of the same bank are independent of each other. Given the dispersion of data 
and to control for the potential effect of outliers, we will use alternative econometric 
techniques in our robustness analysis.  Specifically, we will use median least square 
regressions and robust regressions that both control for the effect of outliers. 
                                                 
4 Therefore, while the profit margin is an accounting residual for each bank, it is not necessarily equal to 
the simple residual for the sector as a whole. 
5 The problem with pooled OLS is that it is inconsistent if E(xη) ≠ 0, and even if E(xη)=0, it is inefficient 
because of serial correlation in the error terms ε =η+ v where η captures the time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity among the observations, v is the residual error component with the classical standard 
assumptions and x= (α, B, I, M).   10
In the academic literature, many definitions for spreads exist, and in the following 
we will make usage of two commonly used spread expressions.
6 Firstly and as defined 
above, we follow Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and define the narrow interest rate 
spread as the difference between interest income received on loans (divided by total 
loans) and interest paid on deposits (divided by total deposits). Secondly, we calculate a 
wider spread measure which is defined as the difference between total interest income 
over total earning assets and total interest expenses over total interest bearing liabilities.
7 
This gives a broader picture of the efficiency of financial intermediation in the Nigerian 
banking sector. Finally, we add fees and commission to the wide spread measure for 
robustness analysis but do not present the findings here.  
Figure 1 shows the quarterly development of the various spread measures 
weighted by the loan share of individual banks from 2000-2005. During our sample 
period, the different spreads exhibit a similar trend and have decreased after some mild 
peak in the beginning of 2002. As expected, the wide spread that includes fees and 
commission is higher than the spread measure without fees throughout the sample period. 
The fact that the narrow spread has been higher than the wide spread measures until 2003 
gives the interesting finding that during 2000-2003 Nigerian banks have enjoyed higher 
spreads in their loan and deposit market segments than their spreads from sources other 
than lending. This gap has somewhat closed after 2003. 
As bank-specific explanatory variables we use overhead as the ratio of overhead 
costs to total assets and anticipate that a higher overhead leads to higher spreads since 
banks usually pass on these costs to the borrowers. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets 
over deposits. For their Latin American sample, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find a 
positive relationship between liquidity and spreads since banks with holdings of liquid 
assets bear higher opportunity costs, and they pass on these costs to borrowers. We also 
                                                 
6 See Brock and  Rojas Suarez (2000) as well as Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) for a discussion of different 
margin definitions. Ideally, we also would have liked to use the ex-ante interest rate spreads as well but this 
data was not available. 
7 Specifically, total earning assets includes total due from other banks, short-term investments, certificates 
of deposits, discounted bills, other financial instruments, net loans and advances, and investments (other 
than short-term). Total interest bearing liabilities includes money at call, interbank takings, total deposits 
and takings, total due to other banks, certificates of deposits, other loans and advances from financial 
institutions, debentures, and other liabilities. 
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employ the equity/ assets (equity) ratio, and according to Martinez Peria and Mody 
(2004), higher equity or capital holdings due to either banks’ voluntary decisions or 
regulation could be costly for banks so a positive relationship should be usually expected. 
Banks typically use multiple sources of funding and besides deposits, equity is an 
important source of funding. If banks hold excessive capital, their opportunity costs could 
increase and lead banks to charge higher spreads. 
In this context, the announcement of new capital requirements by the CBN on 
July 6, 2004, meant that banks had to increase their minimum capital from NN2 billion to 
NN25 billion before the end of 2005. So banks engaged in merger and acquisitions or 
raised more capital on the stock market with the consequence that they obtained abundant 
excess liquidity and equity. This development might put pressure on the spreads charged 
as competition among banks for lending business intensified. Therefore, unlike previous 
studies we expect that spreads are negatively associated with our liquidity and equity 
measure. As illustration, figure 2 plots the historical development of the equity/ assets 
ratio in the Nigerian banking sector. We observe a sharp increase after 2004. 
Since the effects of the new capital requirements on the banks’ liquidity and 
equity only materializes after 2004, we specifically calculate interaction variables 
between liquidity, equity and the years 2004 and 2005 in order to observe any explicit 
effect of liquidity and equity movements in both years on the various spread measures.
8  
We define loan loss provisions as provision for bad debt relative to recoveries 
over total loans. Since both interest rate income and expenses are ex-post items on the 
banks’ income statements we anticipate that higher loan loss provisions should decrease 
the implicitly calculated spreads. 
Furthermore, the variable market share deposits is each bank’s market share in 
the deposit market segment. If banks are able to use market power, we would expect a 
positive sign as these banks can charge higher spreads. In contrast, with economies of 
                                                 
8 One potential concern for the interpretation of the interaction terms might be that there will not be 
sufficient bank observations in 2004 or 2005 due to the merger and acquisition activities so it would be 
unclear what the coefficients of the interaction terms would be picking up. We are not affected by the 
sample size of banks in 2004 or 2005. For example, in the third quarter of 2005 we have data for 84 banks 
so the coefficients of the interaction terms should be able to pick up any effect of liquidity or equity on the 
interest spreads.   12
scale, larger banks might enjoy substantial cost savings and pass these lower costs to 
borrowers so we would expect a negative sign. 
We also include some measures for the diversity of banks’ activities by including 
the interest income share, defined as total interest income over total operating income 
and intermediation, defined as total loans over total liabilities. According to Laeven and 
Levine (2005), a specialized loan-making bank will have a larger interest income share, 
while a specialized investment bank is expected to have a larger share of other operating 
income. If the Nigerian lending market is subject to more competitive pressure, 
specialized loan-making banks are better able to absorb this competition so we anticipate 
a negative relationship between the interest income share and the spreads. Also, banks 
that are more involved in intermediation of loans should be better prepared for 
competition and charge lower spreads so we again expect a negative association between 
intermediation and the various spread measures.  
For measures of banking concentration, we include the Herfindahl index in the 
deposit and lending market segment.
9 Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of the 
development of bank concentration in Nigeria.  In comparison to many African countries, 
bank concentration has been very low in Nigeria.
 10 Only with the announcement of the 
new capital requirements in 2004 and the ensuing merger and acquisition activities have 
we seen increased Herfindahl indices in both the deposit and lending market.  
Finally, we account for potential effects of macroeconomic developments by 
including variables such as annualized quarterly inflation, the real Treasury bill rate, the 
quarterly industrial production growth rate as well as the exchange rate depreciation 
(proxied by its quarterly growth rate).
11  In the past, Nigeria has experienced a very 
volatile macroeconomy and changes in the industrial production index as a proxy for 
GDP growth attempt to capture any business cycle effects that might have an effect on 
bank spreads. Similarly, inflation can affect spreads if monetary shocks are not passed 
                                                 
9 The Herfindahl is the sum of squared market shares in the deposit or the loan market segment, scaled by 
10,000. It ranges from 0 to 1. We scale the Herfindahl in order to make it more comparable with the scale 
of the dependent variables. 
10 According to Cihak and Podpiera (2005) and for illustration, the Herfindahl indices in loans were 0.105 
for Kenya, 0.112 for Tanzania and 0.160 for Uganda in June 2002. After the privatization of the 
government-owned bank UCB, Uganda’s Herfindahl index for deposits has increased to over 0.200 (Beck 
and Hesse, 2006). 
11 The macroeconomic data is from the IMF International Financial Statistics Database.   13
through the same extent to deposit and lending rates, or adjustment occurs at different 
speed. The real Treasury bill rate proxies for the marginal cost of funds, and this 
benchmarks for interest rate decisions by banks. The real T-bill rate could also proxy for 
alternative investment opportunities of banks. Finally, banks’ balance sheets are affected 
by movements in the exchange rates. The appendix provides an overview of all the main 
variables in the panel regressions. 
The balance sheet and income statement data of the Nigerian banks in the sample 
are subject to a wide dispersion of observations among certain variables. Therefore, 
similar to Beck et al (2005), we remove these potential outliers from the summary 
statistics, correlation analysis and subsequent panel estimations. Upon inspection of the 
data, the 1
st and 99
th percentiles of the distribution of both the narrow and wide spread are 
excluded, the 99
th percentile of the distribution of liquidity, loan loss provisions and 
interest income share is excluded as well as the negative observations for the equity 
variable are excluded. 
Table 2 gives some summary and correlation statistics of the main variables in the 
panel estimations used. From panel A, we observe a higher mean and volatility of the 
narrow spread versus the wide spread. This also mirrors the graphical inspection of the 
spreads in figure 1. The ratio of overhead costs to assets averages 6% throughout the 
sample period. Also, despite truncating the distribution of both liquidity and loan loss 
provisions at the 99
th percentile, the variables still exhibit some substantial volatility at 
the top end of their observations. The average market share in the deposit segment is 
negligible at 1% with the highest market share being 20%. This is not surprising given 
the high degree of fragmentation in the Nigerian banking market with a total of 89 banks. 
Annualized quarterly inflation averages 14.4%, the average real Treasury bill rate is close 
to zero but experienced some substantial variation throughout the sample period with a 
range of  -18.4% to 18.9%. Also, industrial production averages 0.9% per quarter on 
average, whereas the exchange rate was subject to a 1.2% depreciation per quarter on 
average. 
The findings from the correlation analysis in panel B of table 2 might anticipate 
some of the signs and significance levels in the subsequent panel estimations. While 
overhead costs are significantly positively correlated with the narrow and wide spreads,   14
liquidity, loan loss provisions and the Herfindahl index for the deposit markets are 
significantly negatively correlated with the spread measures. Unlike our prior hypothesis, 
the equity variable is positively related to the spread measures so the effect of increased 
equity holdings after the new capital requirements is not picked up by the correlation. As 
expected, the interest income share and intermediation proxy are all negatively correlated 
with the spreads though not necessarily significantly in some cases. Finally, there is an 
issue of multicollinearity between both Herfindahl indices in the deposit and lending 
segment so the variables will not be used together in the panel estimations. As a 
cautionary remark, correlation findings do not necessarily reflect causal relationships, 




Results from Accounting Decomposition 
Table 3 shows the interest rate decompositions by year for the full sample and the ex-post 
narrow spread measure. As mentioned before, the figures in the spread decomposition 
tables are based on simple averages across individual banks. 
There is some evidence that the implicit lending rates have come down over the 
years 2001-2005 and so have deposit rates to a lesser extent, overall resulting in a 
decreasing spread. Both taxes and reserve requirements can only explain a very small 
percentage of the spread behavior in contrast to overhead costs which accounts for a 
sizable proportion of the spread. Since there is no clear discernible trend in overhead 
costs, the reductions in the spread is mainly driven by lower profit margins which have 
halved from 2001 to 2005. Some possible explanations for lower bank profit margins 
could be the improved macroeconomic environment during the sample period and more 
competition in the loan and deposit market segment. 
In contrast to the spread decomposition by years in table 3, table 4 offers a spread 
decomposition based on total asset size for the third quarter of 2005 in order to capture 
possible differences in the determinants of spreads for small vs. larger banks. Why do we 
specifically choose the third quarter of 2005? As mentioned before, one of the interests in 
this paper is to predict or anticipate how financial intermediation of the Nigerian banking   15
sector will evolve in the post-consolidated period. The third quarter of 2005 might offer a 
good snapshot to assess the differences of small and large banks before the new capital 
requirements became effective in January 2006. 
 The implicit deposit rates and also to a certain extent the lending rates of larger 
banks are lower than smaller banks in 2005 III, resulting in lower spreads for the larger 
banks. Also, larger banks enjoy significantly lower overhead costs than smaller banks due 
to possible economies of scale effects. Despite lower spreads, larger banks earn higher 
profit margins than smaller banks, mainly driven by their low overhead costs. Similar to 
the spread decomposition by years, taxes and reserve requirements can only explain a 
small percentage of the variation of the spread. 
Even though table 4 only provides a snapshot, the results suggest that larger banks 
might be more successful in efficiently channeling funds from depositors to borrowers 
than smaller banks. With the consolidation of the banking sector that saw the 89 banks 
being reduced to 25 banks, overhead costs should be expected to further decrease as 
economies of scale effects will be materialized. The increased competition among the 
larger 25 banks for deposits and profitable outlets for their abundant liquidity, will most 
likely drive down profit margins so further lowering spreads. 
Of course, the interest rate decompositions in table 3 and 4 were based on an 
accounting exercise, and we did not include loan loss provisions since the interest rate 
spread was an ex-post measure of the interest income and expenses. The panel 
estimations will offer a more insightful approach in capturing the determinants of the 
interest rate spreads by including bank-specific (including loan loss provisions), banking 
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Results from Panel Estimations 
Table 5 presents the pooled OLS and fixed effects results for the narrow spread and table 
6 for the wide spread measure. As mentioned before, all regressions include yearly and 
quarterly dummy variables, and we report t-values based on clustered standard errors as 
well as 
2 R  with and without bank dummies (since the
2 R  of the fixed effects models 
exclude the cross section variation due to the bank dummies).
12 Except column 1, all 
regressions use bank- level fixed effects.  
There is some strong evidence that higher overhead costs lead to both higher 
narrow and wider spreads, as banks pass on these additional costs to borrowers. Loan loss 
provisions have a significantly negative effect on both spread measures in all model 
specifications. This is not surprising since the spreads are an ex-post measure so 
increased provisions for bad debts should result in lower interest income on the banks’ 
income statements. Also, after controlling for overhead costs we do not observe any 
evidence that larger banks (in terms of market share in deposits) either charge 
significantly lower or higher spreads.  
The effect of liquidity on the narrow spread is mixed and unclear whereas higher 
banks’ liquid holdings appear to decrease the wide spread, even though this effect is often 
not significant. Equity does not significantly influence the spreads even though the signs 
are predominantly negative.    
To better capture any possible effects of liquidity and equity in the context of the 
announcement of new capital requirements and subsequent merger and acquisition 
activities among Nigerian banks during 2004 and 2005, we interact both liquidity and 
equity variables with the yearly dummy variables 2004 as well as 2005. Column 3 in 
table 5 and 6 gives the result for liquidity. For the narrow spread measure in table 5, the 
effect of both interaction variables is negative but insignificant and of small magnitude 
whereas for the wide spread in table 6, only the interaction with 2005 is negative and 
close to being significant but also with a small economic magnitude. 
Column 4 in tables 5 and 6 shows the relevant findings for the interaction of 
equity and the yearly dummy variables in 2004 and 2005. Overall, equity movements in 
                                                 
12 As stated before, models that have macroeconomic control factors do not include yearly or quarterly 
dummy variables in order not to distort the effects of the macroeconomic variables.   17
2005 had a negative effect on both the narrow and wide spread, even though the effect is 
not significant in the model specifications with bank-level fixed effects. Estimating the 
narrow and wide models in columns 3 and 4 with pooled OLS instead yields significantly 
negative coefficients for the interaction terms of liquidity and equity with the 2005 year 
dummy (Results available on request). It might be the case that the fixed effects 
regressions are not able to pick up the effect of liquidity*2005 and equity*2005. We will 
come back to this precise issue in the robustness section. 
The negative signs of liquidity*2005 and equity*2005 are in contrast to previous 
research in the area (such as Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) which on the one hand, 
finds a positive relationship between liquidity measures and spreads due to banks’ 
foregone interest income that is recovered from borrowers in form of higher spreads, and 
on the other hand, obtains a positive relationship between equity and spreads since 
excessive capital holdings can be costly for banks.  
Overall, the negative sign of liquidity*2005 and equity*2005 confirms our prior 
hypothesis that banks with increased equity holdings which were also more likely to have 
higher liquidity due to the announced capital requirements could have been looking for 
lending and investment opportunities and might have lowered their spreads in 2005. We 
elaborate on and reinforce the above argument in the robustness section. 
13 
Column 5 includes both the interest income share and the intermediation proxy. 
As expected, more loan-specializing banks charge lower narrow and wide spreads even 
though the effect is only significant for the wide spread measure. Unlike investment 
banks that generate their income mainly from activities other than lending, loan-
specializing banks are more able to react to competitive pressure and therefore charge 
lower spreads. Similarly, banks with a higher intermediating role, that is, have a higher 
lending portfolio relative to their total liabilities, also charge lower spreads.  
From column 6 and 7, there is some strong evidence that a higher bank 
concentration in the Nigerian deposit and lending market segments has led to 
                                                 
13 Due to the merger negotiations during the transition year 2005 and raising money in capital markets, 
some Nigerian banks were known to have been recalling some of their loan exposures. Therefore, this 
might be initially a complementary explanation for the negative relationship between liquidity and equity 
and the ex-post spreads in 2005. But then we would expect a significantly negative correlation between 
equity as well as liquidity holdings and the loan growth rate during 2004 and 2005. This is not the case. In 
addition, the regressions already account for loan loss provisions so the effect of equity and liquidity on the 
spreads can be seen as the ‘pure’ effect.    18
significantly lower narrow and wide spreads.
14  This finding is quite interesting in light of 
the Nigerian consolidation exercise since it might indicate that a more concentrated 
banking sector as we find today after the implementation of the new capital requirements 
might indeed be potentially beneficial for increasing financial intermediation in Nigeria 
and lowering banking spreads. We are aware that the Herfindahl index has its caveats in 
capturing banking concentration such as its inability to account for market segmentation, 
efficiency considerations or threat of entry from new institutions (See Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). But the consistency of the results across different spread definitions 
makes us somewhat confident that indeed there might be some benefit by having a more 
concentrated banking system after controlling for overhead costs. Of course, another 
caveat from this conjecture is that the pre-consolidated period faced a different market 
structure from the current market structure after 2006 so it might well be the case that 
findings from the pre-consolidated Herfindahl might not be projected to the post-
consolidated period. 
Finally, column 8 incorporates some macroeconomic control variables. We do 
find some strong evidence that both the inflation and real Treasury bill rate were key 
drivers of both spread measures during 2000-2005. The positive effect of the inflation 
rate on the spreads could be potentially explained by the fact that monetary shocks are 
not passed through the same extent to deposit and lending rates. Also, higher real 
Treasury bill rates lead to an increase of banks’ marginal costs of funds. Banks will 
incorporate these higher funding costs in their lending rates so this might cause the higher 
spreads. Also, higher t-bill rates might constitute an alternative investment opportunity 
for banks and might led to some substitution towards the T-bill market and away from 
pure lending. Finally, there is some evidence that a weakening exchange rate is 
associated with a higher wide spread but not narrow spreads.  
Also, an inspection of the coefficients in both the narrow and wide spread 
regressions reveals that coefficients magnitude are in general lower for the wide spread 
measure. This might be explained by the fact that the explanatory factors are more suited 
to explain the narrow spread since it is based on only interest income from loans and 
                                                 
14 We note that the Herfindahl indices are scaled by 10,000 to allow for a more adequate measurement of 
the coefficient size.   19
expenses from deposits. The wide spread measure includes total earnings assets as well as 
total interest bearing liabilities, and the explanatory variables are probably less able to 
explain a wider range of the banks’ interest generating and paying activities. 
 
VI. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we briefly analyze whether the reported findings from above are robust to 
different estimation methods and also to the alternative wide spread definition that does 
include interest rate fees and charges. We employ the same samples and model 
specifications in the robust and MLS regressions as in tables 5 and 6, that is, the same 
exclusion criteria are adopted  as well as the same variables used. 
We use two alternative estimation techniques to control for the impact of outliers. 
Firstly, the robust estimation technique uses all observations available, but assigns 
different weights to avoid the impact of outliers (Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005). 
Specifically, through an iterative process, observations are weighted based on the 
absolute value of their residuals, with observations with large residuals being assigned 
smaller weights. Secondly, the median least squares (MLS) estimator minimizes the 
median square of residuals rather than the average and thus reduces the effect of outliers. 
A look at Table 2, panel A, confirms that the median and mean differ quite a lot for many 
variables. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the panel estimations based on the robust estimation 
technique. Most of the main previous findings hold which can be viewed as a very strong 
result given the usual data problems surrounding bank balance sheet and income 
statement data from developing countries especially in Africa. To focus on a few results, 
there is now some evidence that banks with higher liquidity holdings charge lower 
narrow and wider spreads in 2004 and 2005. The interaction term of liquidity with the 
year dummy 2005 is significantly negative for both the narrow and wider spreads which 
provides additional support for the hypothesis that banks subject to increased liquidity 
holdings might have been for looking for lending outlets and lowered spreads. A small 
caveat is that unlike the sizable economic effect of overhead costs on spreads, the 
economic magnitude of liquidity is rather small.   20
Similarly, the interaction variable equity*2005 is significantly negative for both 
spread measures. As argued before, the new minimum capital requirements led banks to 
raise substantial new equity on the capital markets or by merging with competitors. So in 
combination with their potential quest for deposits and lending outlets as liquidity 
holdings soared, spreads came down.  
The MLS regressions in tables 9 and 10 provide a similar picture as the robust 
estimations, and the findings for the interaction of liquidity and equity with the year 
dummy 2005 actually become stronger. To add to the consistency of the empirical 
findings, we calculate another wide spread measure that includes interest fees and 
charges so giving a more complete picture of the banks’ spreads from their interest 
income and expenses. Again, we find that the previous results hold (results are available 
on request). Finally, we estimated fixed effects models for large banks only. Specifically, 
we only included bank observations of banks in two types of models where the total 
assets size was in the upper 50
th or 75
th percentiles, respectively. The main findings hold 
for both the narrow and wide spread measures. Interestingly, the effect of equity on the 
spreads in 2005 becomes more significantly negative which might indicate that larger 
banks potentially charged lower spreads than an average bank before the new capital 
requirements became effective in 2006. Overall, the robustness tests have reinforced our 




This paper has analyzed the individual bank spreads from 2000-2005 in Nigeria in the 
context of the banking consolidation that saw the banking sector shrink from 89 to 25 
banks by January 2006. Even though there is no available data yet for the post-reform 
consolidated banking sector, our analysis provides some evidence that the CBN’s 
decision to increase the minimum capital requirements could be justified. 
From the spread decomposition, we observe that larger banks have enjoyed lower 
overhead costs than smaller banks and also charged lower spreads. Also, profit margins 
have come down during 2000-2005. The spread regressions showed that especially in 
2005 both liquidity and equity holdings are negatively related to spreads. We explained   21
this by banks’ likely incentives to increase their liquidity and equity before the new law 
on capital requirements took effect on January 1
st, 2006. Thus, banks that were looking 
for lending and investment outlets probably charged lower spreads.  
We also find that an increased banking concentration, as measured by the 
Herfindahl index in the deposit and lending market segments, has not led to higher 
spreads. Another key finding in this paper is the importance of overhead costs as well as 
the macroeconomic environment in explaining spreads. High overhead costs are 
positively related to high spreads in all model specifications. Also, low inflation and real 
treasury bill rates as well as a stable exchange rate can be conducive to lower spreads and 
therefore cause a more efficient channeling of savings to productive investments. Overall, 
we bear in mind that 2005 can be seen as a transition year for the Nigerian banks so 
besides financial intermediation, banks were also in merger negotiations as well as raised 
substantial money on capital markets. 
What might be the likely effect of the new capital requirements and banking 
environment on the financial intermediation capacity of the banking sector in the near 
future? On the one hand, banks are flush with excess liquidity and are highly 
overcapitalized so there will be some aggressive competition for profitable lending 
opportunities, potentially leading to further decreasing spreads. With the merger and 
acquisition activity during the banking consolidation, synergies and cost savings and 
therefore lower overhead costs could also lower spreads in the future.  
On the other hand, there are still some major obstacles in permanently increasing 
financial intermediation especially to the poor. An uncertain macroeconomic 
environment could potentially be detrimental for efficient financial intermediation. Also, 
from a micro perspective, there is no credit information bureau or adequate identification 
scheme that allows banks to screen their borrowers. Furthermore, the absence of a central 
land registry makes it hard for banks to verify a borrower’s claim of a particular property 
ownership that is intended for loan collateral. The registration of mortgages is also very 
difficult. These legal problems could undermine an efficient degree of financial 
intermediation and maintain a high wedge between lending and deposit rates. 











1985 27.04% 25.78% 14.79% 20.52% 40
1990 19.51% 11.59% 11.88% 13.73% 107
1991 21.08% 11.24% 11.45% 15.11% 119
1992 19.87% 11.11% 11.64% 14.29% 119
1993 25.01% 16.05% 13.88% 17.37% 119
1994 25.88% 17.50% 12.39% 16.43% 116
1995 15.98% 11.42% 9.18% 9.80% 115
1996 12.86% 9.99% 8.42% 8.12% 115
1997 13.83% 11.57% 9.69% 9.07% 115
1998 16.71% 13.71% 11.83% 11.12% 89
1999 18.47% 16.23% 12.25% 12.93% 89
2000 18.44% 16.33% 10.96% 13.31% 89
2001 25.14% 20.46% 14.89% 18.07% 89
2002 26.78% 22.36% 16.10% 19.33% 89
2003 24.78% 20.84% 14.60% 17.31% 89
2004 24.59% 21.40% 15.47% 17.33% 89
Table 1: Financial Indicators in Nigeria
Source: Updated version of the Financial Structure Database (World Bank) by Beck 
et al (2000) and number of banks by Lewis and Stein (2002) and own data. Liquid 
liabilities are over GDP. Bank assets are claims by deposit money banks on the 
domestic real nonfinancial sector as a share of GDP. Private credit is by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Financial system deposits are 
defined as demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP.  23
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlation
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Narrow Spread 1862 0.189 0.164 0.172 -0.150 1.092
Wide Spread 1864 0.105 0.095 0.069 -0.058 0.398
Overhead 1904 0.057 0.049 0.038 0.000 0.743
Liquidity 1888 0.864 0.781 0.435 0.022 3.862
Loan Loss Provisions 1888 0.156 0.050 0.326 -2.573 3.120
Market Share Deposits 1907 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.204
Equity 1907 0.132 0.111 0.094 0.000 0.906
Interest Income Share 1880 1.203 1.058 0.739 0.000 8.733
Intermediation 1907 0.355 0.350 0.145 -0.642 0.915
Herfindahl Deposits 24 0.047 0.044 0.011 0.036 0.076
Herfindahl Loans 24 0.035 0.032 0.007 0.028 0.052
Inflation 24 0.144 0.138 0.067 -0.019 0.285
Real Treasury Bill Rate 23 0.007 0.016 0.085 -0.184 0.189
Industrial Production Growth 23 0.009 0.003 0.031 -0.042 0.074
Exchange Rate Depreciation 24 0.012 0.004 0.025 -0.025 0.077
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data
Note: The summary statistics are calculated for the sample period 2000 I-2005 IV; The 1st and 99th 
percentiles of the distribution both the narrow and wide spread are excluded; the 99th percentile of the 
distribution liquidity of loan loss provisions and interest income share is excluded; negative 
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Wide Spread 0.600*** 1
Overhead 0.186*** 0.263*** 1
Liquidity -0.040* -0.122*** -0.110*** 1
Loan Loss Provisions -0.126*** -0.115*** 0.230*** 0.0201 1
Market Share Deposits -0.033 -0.057** -0.135*** 0.011 -0.048** 1
Equity 0.042* 0.002 0.029 0.138*** -0.141*** -0.240*** 1
Interest Income Share -0.022 -0.054** -0.043* -0.177*** 0.001 -0.121*** 0.149*** 1
Intermediation -0.221*** -0.005 0.019 -0.519*** 0.053** -0.233*** 0.017 0.241*** 1
Herfindahl Deposits -0.067** -0.091*** -0.032 0.018 -0.006 0.114*** -0.015 -0.074*** -0.023 1
Herfindahl Loans -0.011 -0.031 -0.035 0.040* 0.008 0.118*** -0.040 -0.063*** -0.042* 0.871*** 1
Observations: 1806
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
loss provisions and interest income share is excluded; negative observations for the equity variable are excluded.















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Implicit Lending Rate 32.14% 36.59% 27.24% 27.23% 24.10%
Implicit Deposit Rate 12.00% 13.43% 11.37% 11.21% 9.54%
Spread 20.14% 23.16% 15.87% 16.01% 14.56%
Overhead Costs 6.59% 8.38% 6.96% 7.48% 7.56%
Profit Margin 11.29% 12.30% 7.20% 6.63% 5.51%
Taxes 0.16% 0.09% -0.11% 0.11% 0.04%
Reserve Requirement 1.33% 1.49% 1.26% 1.25% 1.06%
Observations 317 341 341 343 313
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data













Implicit Lending Rate 25.11% 21.73% 25.61% 19.48%
Implicit Deposit Rate 8.69% 10.19% 10.20% 5.60%
Spread 16.42% 11.54% 15.41% 13.88%
Overhead Costs 9.46% 7.14% 8.83% 4.72%
Profit Margin 6.80% 2.84% 5.42% 7.56%
Taxes 0.21% -0.35% -0.07% 0.09%
Reserve Requirement 0.97% 1.13% 1.13% 0.62%
Observations 21 21 21 21
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data
Table 4: Interest Rate Decompositions by Assets in 2005 III
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Overhead 1.174 1.131 1.093 1.088 1.041 1.139 1.139 1.421
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.017)** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.016 0.022 0.032 0.03 -0.06 0.022 0.022 0.026
(0.280) (0.137) (0.039)** (0.045)** (0.004)*** (0.137) (0.140) (0.108)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.092 -0.09 -0.092 -0.092 -0.067 -0.09 -0.09 -0.091
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Market Share Deposits 0.039 -0.789 -0.658 -0.642 -1.455 -0.687 -0.693 -0.495
(0.846) (0.169) (0.295) (0.315) (0.004)*** (0.249) (0.252) (0.484)
Equity 0.093 -0.104 -0.134 -0.105 -0.051 -0.086 -0.086 -0.122



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.622
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth -0.005
(0.957)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.056
(0.691)
Constant 0.144 0.142 0.115 0.114 0.425 0.212 0.208 0.046
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.226)
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,806 1,828 1,828 1,770
Root MSE  0.161 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.136 0.144 0.144 0.144
R-squared 0.122 0.118 0.113 0.113 0.212 0.119 0.119 0.106
R-Squared incl. Bank Dummies 0.334 0.330 0.331 0.407 0.335 0.335 0.347
Type of Regression OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Overhead 0.563 0.64 0.624 0.613 0.62 0.648 0.65 0.89
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.021 -0.004 0.001 0.00002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.004 0.001
(0.004)*** (0.584) (0.864) (0.997) (0.009)*** (0.567) (0.543) (0.840)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.041 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 -0.026 -0.029
(0.000)*** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.022)** (0.032)** (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.003)***
Market Share Deposits 0.001 0.072 0.137 0.135 -0.05 0.139 0.16 0.138
(0.988) (0.722) (0.442) (0.455) (0.803) (0.488) (0.434) (0.493)
Equity 0.05 -0.038 -0.046 -0.028 -0.014 -0.028 -0.024 -0.047



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.321
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth -0.039
(0.345)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.131
(0.018)**
Constant 0.1 0.08 0.066 0.066 0.126 0.125 0.138 0.013
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.371)
Observations 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,810 1,831 1,831 1,772
Root MSE 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.052
R-squared 0.185 0.196 0.187 0.187 0.216 0.201 0.203 0.21
R-squared incl. Bank Dummies 0.444 0.438 0.438 0.464 0.448 0.449 0.476
Type of Regression OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overhead 1.286 1.242 1.206 1.122 1.295 1.294 1.107
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.019 -0.008 -0.016 -0.079 -0.02 -0.02 -0.016
(0.012)** (0.291) (0.041)** (0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.041)**
Loan Loss Provisions -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.062 -0.083 -0.082 -0.081
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Market Share Deposits 0.252 0.262 0.287 -0.286 0.273 0.274 0.241
(0.096)* (0.087)* (0.060)* (0.056)* (0.073)* (0.072)* (0.135)
Equity 0.159 0.136 0.213 0.209 0.17 0.172 0.177



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.659
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth -0.022
(0.842)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.026
(0.853)
Constant 0.099 0.073 0.073 0.299 0.159 0.166 0.026
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.173)
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,806 1,828 1,828 1,770
R-squared 0.178 0.166 0.169 0.249 0.18 0.179 0.128
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overhead 0.793 0.768 0.744 0.735 0.798 0.801 0.747
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.021 -0.014 -0.019 -0.027 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Loan Loss Provisions -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 -0.035 -0.039 -0.039 -0.041
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Market Share Deposits 0.084 0.088 0.103 0.022 0.097 0.100 0.086
(0.160) (0.148) (0.089)* (0.723) (0.104) (0.095)* (0.175)
Equity 0.078 0.061 0.107 0.087 0.084 0.086 0.068



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.341
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth 0.002
(0.964)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.129
(0.019)**
Constant 0.08 0.066 0.065 0.103 0.125 0.131 0.021
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)***
Observations 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,810 1,831 1,831 1,772
R-squared 0.31 0.283 0.289 0.309 0.315 0.315 0.252
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overhead 1.45 1.448 1.386 1.181 1.488 1.475 1.38
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.031 -0.017 -0.024 -0.085 -0.031 -0.029 -0.027
(0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Loan Loss Provisions -0.093 -0.083 -0.088 -0.063 -0.093 -0.092 -0.087
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Market Share Deposits 0.22 0.239 0.224 -0.326 0.242 0.191 0.15
(0.124) (0.073)* (0.130) (0.035)** (0.143) (0.219) (0.269)
Equity 0.138 0.103 0.207 0.206 0.153 0.137 0.185



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.645
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth -0.039
(0.682)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.057
(0.632)
Constant 0.106 0.078 0.084 0.315 0.183 0.195 0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.229)
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,806 1,828 1,828 1,770
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overhead 0.681 0.655 0.646 0.613 0.646 0.637 0.738
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Liquidity -0.022 -0.016 -0.021 -0.029 -0.022 -0.023 -0.021
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Loan Loss Provisions -0.043 -0.044 -0.042 -0.032 -0.043 -0.04 -0.043
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Market Share Deposits 0.042 0.056 0.093 0.001 0.071 0.078 0.067
(0.434) (0.332) (0.147) (0.990) (0.241) (0.187) (0.294)
Equity 0.057 0.045 0.091 0.075 0.071 0.074 0.055



















Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.315
(0.000)***
Industrial Production Growth -0.016
(0.715)
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.193
(0.001)***
Constant 0.091 0.079 0.076 0.112 0.134 0.135 0.026
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Observations 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,810 1,831 1,831 1,772
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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2000q1 2001q3 2003q1 2004q3 2006q1
date
(sum) wide_spread_fees (sum) wide_spread
(sum) narrow_spread
 
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data 
The spreads are weighted by their loan share.   
 
 











2000q1 2001q3 2003q1 2004q3 2006q1
date
(sum) equity_lending (sum) equity_deposit
 
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data 





























2000q1 2001q3 2003q1 2004q3 2006q1
date
(mean) Herfindahl_loans (mean) Herfindahl_deposits
 
Source: Own calculations based on CBN data 
The Herfindahl index is calculated as the summation of the individual banks’ market shares squared, scaled 
by 10,000. The Herfindahl in the deposit market is given by herfindahl_deposits and in the lending market 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Name Description Source
Narrow Interest Rate Margin Difference between interest income received on loans 
(divided by total loans) and interest paid on deposits 
(divided by total deposits)
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
and author's calculations
Wide Interest Rate Margin Difference between total interest income over total 
earning assets and total interest expenses over total 
interest bearing liabilities.
CBN and author's calculations
Overhead Overhead costs over total assets CBN and author's calculations
Liquidity Liquid assets over deposits CBN and author's calculations
Equity Total equity over total assets CBN and author's calculations
Liquidity*2004, Liquidity*2005 Interaction of liquidity variable with year dummy CBN and author's calculations
Equity*2004, Equity*2005 Interaction of equity variable with year dummy CBN and author's calculations
Loan Loss Provisions Provisions for bad debt relative to recoveries over 
total loans
CBN and author's calculations
Market share deposits Bank's market share in the deposit market segment CBN and author's calculations
Interest Income Share Total interest income over total operating income CBN and author's calculations
Intermediation Total loans over total liabilities CBN and author's calculations
Herfindahl deposits/ loans Sum of squared market shares of banks in the deposit 
or the loan market segment, scaled by 10,000. The 
Herfindahl ranges from 0 to 1.
CBN and author's calculations
Inflation Annualized quarterly change of the CPI index IMF International Financial 
Statistics Database
Real T-Bill Rate The nominal treasury bill rate adjusted for the 
inflation rate
IMF International Financial 
Statistics Database
Industrial Production Growth Quartely growth rate of industrial production index IMF International Financial 
Statistics Database
Exchange Rate Depreciation Quarterly growth rate of Nigerian Naira (NN) per 
US$
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